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I- lOIIIDOil; BIASES IN THE ORGANIZATION
There has bean a great deal of research conducted into
how individuals go about making decisions and about how
biases can enter into the decision making process and effect
the outcome of a decision. However, there has not been a
great deal written about hew these biases effect decisions
in an organizational environment. The purpose of this
thesis is to examine data provided by two different organi-
zations to see if these biases can be observed in forecasts
produced within the organizations. The focus will be
centered upon budgetary decisions within firms in both the
private and public sectors. The budget was chosen because
it is extremely important tc the orderly functioning of any
organization and, consequently, decisions concerning the
budget should be well thought out and thoroughly researched.
There have been cases in which the organizational budg-
etary development process has been criticized especially in
public organizations. Larkey and Smith [Ref. 1] have
researched the budgetary problems of a large city government
over a thirty-six year period and have found empirically
that the majority of the budget problems within that city
have been overstated in their severity— understating
revenues and overstating e xpenditurss--in such a manner as
to absolve those accountable from any responsibility.
Larkey and Smith found that in most instances misrepresenta-
tion of budgetary problems appeared to have been done not
for repugnent reasons, but rather to help protect city offi-
cials from themselves in their roles (i.e., to increase the
pressure to make fiscally responsible decisions). [Ref. 2]
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter II
reviews the applicable literature concerning heuristics as

they pertain to decision theory. Two facets of decision
theory normative, and prescriptive, are discussed. In addi-
tion the concept of expected utility is presented. Finally
commonly occurring heuristic principles that individuals
rely upon when faced with decision making are introduced.
Chapters III and 17 present and analyze the data. Chapter
III deals with a large government organization, the Navy
Stock Fund, while Chapter IV is about a division within a
large private corporation. The process of producing a
budget within each organization is discussed v?ry briefly.
Finally the relation between the budgets and the forecasts
which predict these budgets is examined. The object is to
see if any of the heuristic biases discussed in Chapter II
can be found in the relations between actual results and the
forecasting of those results. If a strong link can be made
between the forecast errors and heuristics identified in the
literature then individual decision making biases must be of
concern ir. managing organizations. If not, then it would
seem- that organizational effects have overcome the effects
of individual heuristics in forecasting. Chapter V contains
a brief review of the findings.

II. HEOBISTICS AND DECISION THEORY
A. INTBCDOCTION
Mcst pecple have had occasion to look back on various
decisions affecting their business and personal lives with a
mixture of pleasure and regret. In :20th situations it is
usually difficult to determine the real factors which infl-
uenced the decisions. While time tends to blur our recol-
lections of details and we may offer what appear tc be
creditable reasons fcr our behavior, a searching review
often reveals that a decision was not as wall considered as
it might have been. Frequently our good and bad choices
resulted from a combination of random knowledge and a
limited understanding of consequences, rather than from a
rational choice of possible alternatives. The ability to
make good decisions has long been recognized as an attribute
necessary for the successful manager; however, no method of
ensuring these decisions has yet been developed. In fact,
the area of decision theory is being studied by researchers
from an increasingly diverse set of disciplines including
medicine, economics, education, political science,
geography, engineering, marketing, management science, and
mathematics, as well as psychology.
Decision theory is concerned with the problems of
choice. Cider forms cf the theory were primarily philosoph-
ical and concerned with how man and organizations should
choose tc achieve their objectives. These were normative
theories and offered recommendations and guides on decision
making. Later, descriptive theories which were more psycho-
logical in nature developed and became concerned with how
people or firms actually do make decisions, or with attempts

to predict how a decision maker will actually choose.
Combining the two questions of should and how complicated
the problem significantly. As staged by Reitzel:
has assumed that decision-making was something
; and as such rested upon the trained experi-
iudgment of individuals. Decision theory
Practice
of an art
ence and j c
implies that there is a science of decision -making; that
*
ipo
sciences. [ Eef. 3 ]
Behavioral decision thecry has two interrelated facets,
normative and descriptive. The normative theory is
concerned with prescribing courses of action that conform
most closely to the decision maker's beliefs and values.
Describing these beliefs and values and the manner in which
individuals incorporate them into their decisions is the aim
of descriptive decision thecry. The key to understanding
any decisicn-making process is to find the ways in which the
decision maker organizes complex and dynamic problems into a
workable framework.
Several decades ago a popular approach to teaching
people hew to make decisions using the concept of expected
utility was developed. Leading proponents of this concept
viewed expected utility as a prescriptive notion rather than
a description of how pecple actually make decisions.
Expected Utility Thecry proposed that if an action had a
number of possible consequences, the decision maker multi-
plied the probability cf each consequence times the utility
of that consequence and then summed over the consequences to
decide the expected utility of that action. When faced with
alternative actions the decision maker chose the one with
the highest expected utility. Since many interesting deci-
sions involve outcomes for which "objective" probabilities
cannot be calculated, researchers proposed using guesses of
10

these probabilities, referred 10 as subjective
probabilities.
Considerable effort: has been devoted to studying how
people perceive, process, and evaluate the likelihood of the
occurrence of uncertain events. Early research on intuitive
statistics led Petersen and Beach to the conclusion:
Man gambles well. He survives and prospers while using
fallible information to infer the states of his uncer-
tain environment and to predict future events.
Experiments that have compared human inferences with
these cf statistical man show that the normative model
provides a good first approximation for a psychological
theory cf inference. inferences made by subjects are
influenced by appropriate variables in appropriate
directions. [Bef. 4]
One result cf this high regard for our intellectual
capability has been a reliance on normative models in
descriptive research. Barclay et . al. proposed beginning
with a normative model and adjusting its form or parameters
to produce a descriptive model. This approach is best exem-
plified by the study cf conservatism; the tendency, when
evaluating uncertain information, to predict future outcomes
that are very close to what actually happened the last time,
using new information in a statistically incorrect manner.
[Bef, 5]
Were recent studies have shown, however, that conserva-
tism cccurs only in certain kinds of inference tasks. In a
variety of other settings, people's inferences are too
extreme, leading to skepticism aoout the normative model's
ability to fulfill its descriptive role. The belief that
humans are good intuitive statisticians began to lose favor
as pointed cut by Carroll et. al. :
People systematically violate the principles of rational
decision making when judging probabilities, making
Eredicticns or otherwise attempting to cop- with prcba-
ilistic tasks. (Bef. 6]
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E. HEURISTICS AND BUSES
Recent research suggests that the decision process used
by the decision maker is fundamentally different from the
normative model. Some of the research on judgmental
processes attempts to evaluate man's ability to assess
subjective probabilities, that is probabilities which are
assigned by individuals based upon their "best guess" in
contrast tc "objective probabilities" wherein data on
previous events are systematically analyzed.
Hogarth argues that man is a selective, sequential
information processor with limited capacity and that he is,
therefore, ill-suited for assessing probability distribu-
tions. Hogarth concludes that because assessing -these
distributions places specific demands on man's judgmental
processes, it is necessary to understand the capabilities
and limitations of these processes and how they are affected
by characteristics of the judgmental task. [ Ref - 7] Tversky
and Kahneman argue that people rely on a limited number of
heuristic principles that reduce the complex tasks of
assessing subjective probabilities and predicting values to
simpler judgmental operations. They identify three such
principles a human judge might use: (1) "representative-
ness"— the degree to which an event is judged similar in
essential characteristics tc its parent population and
judged to reflect the salient features of the process by
which it is generated; (2) "availability"-- the ease with
which relevant instances or examples or plausible occur-
rences can be brought to mind; and (3) "anchoring and
adjustment"-- the prccess of adjusting from initial values
to yield new final estimates. Tversky and Kahneman conclude
that even though these heuristic principles are quite
useful, they can lead to serious and systematic errors
because they are net influenced by factcrs that should




The representativeness heuristic suggests that one
way people evaluate the subjective probability of an avert,
or a sample, is by the degree to which it is judged similar
in essential properties to the group from which it was
selected. In many situations, a person will judge the prob-
ability that object A belongs to class B, or that event A
originates from process B, or that process B will generate
event A on the basis of the degree to which A is representa-
tive of, cr resembles, B. When A is judged highly represen-
tative of E, the probability that A originates frcm B is
judged to be high. When A is judgad not highly representa-
tive of E, the probability that A originates frcm B is
judged tc be low. [ Eef . 9]
This approach, where class membership of an object
is judged by its similarity to the stereotypical class
member, leads to several systematic biases in probability
estimation. [Ref. 10] To test the hypothesis that intuitive
predictions may be affected by representativeness and,
consequently, be relatively insensitive to prior probabili-
ties, Kahneman and Tversky presented 171 subjects with brief
personality descriptions of several individuals, sampled at
random from a group of 100 professional engineers and
lawyers. The subjects were asked to assess, for each-
description, the probability that it belonged to an engineer
rather than to a lawyer. In one experimental condition,
subjects were told that the group from which the descrip-
tions had been drawn consisted of seventy engineers and
thirty lawyers. In another condition, subjects were told
that the group consisted of thirty engineers and seventy
lawyers.
The results revealed that in the absence of a
personality sketch, the subjects judged the probability that
13

an unknown individual was an engineer to be the same as the
proportion of engineers in the population — 70 and 30
percent respectively in the two conditions. However, prior
probabilities (i.e. , the known proportion of engineers in
the population) were totally ignored when a character
description was introduced, even when the description was
totally uninformati ve. The odds that any particular
description belonged to an engineer rather than to a lawyer
should have been higter in the first condition, where there
was a majority of engineers, than in the seccnd condition,
where there v,as a majority of lawyers. let, the subjects in
both conditions produced essentially the same probability
judgments. Apparently, the subjects evaluated the likeli-
hood that a particular description belonged to an engineer
rather than to a lawyer by the degree to which this descrip-
tion was representative of the two stereotypes, with little
or no regard for the prior probabilities of the categories.
[Ref. 11]
Another factor that should have an effect en judg-
ments of subjective probabilities, but that may have no
effect on representativeness, is sample size. The simi-
larity of a sample statistic to a population parameter does
net depend on the size of the sample. Consequently, if
probabilities are assessed by representativeness, the judged
probability of a sample statistic will be essentially inde-
pendent cf sample size.
Kahneman and Tversky found that subjects failed to
appreciate the role cf sample size in making judgments of
subjective probability, even when it was emphasized in the
formulation of the problem. They presented ninety- seven
subjects with three problems each of which defined a
sampling process with a specified mean and a critical value
above the mean. Subjects were asked to judge whether a
particular sample outcome was more likely to occur in a
14

small sample, in a larga sample, or about the same in both.
Half of the subjects were given outcomes that were mors
extreme than the specified critical value; the remaining
subjects were given outcomes that ware less extreme than the
specified critical value. Tversky and Kahneman found that
most of the subjects judged the prooabiiity of obtaining
outcomes that were either more or less extreme than the
specified critical values to be about the same in small and
large samples, presumably because these events were
described by the same statistic and were, therefore, equally
representative of the general population. Sampling theory
suggests that an outcome that is more extreme than the spec-
ified critical value is more likely in a small sample than a
large one, because a large sample is less likely to stray
from the specified mean. However, they concluded that this
fundamental notion of statistics was "evidently not part of
the subject's repertoire of intuitions." [Bef. 12]
Another factor that should have a major effect on
judgments of subjective probability is the presence of
correlated input variables. The statistics of correlation
assert that, given input variables of stated validity, a
prediction based on several input variables will achieve
higher accuracy when these variables are independent of each
ether than when they are correlated. Yet, even though
correlation among input variables tends to decrease the
accuracy of the predictions, Kahneman and Tversky suggest
that it tends to increase the confidence people have in the
resulting predictions. They suggest that internal consis-
tency of a pattern of input variables tends to be a major
determinant of one's confidence in predictions based on
these variables. They also suggest that highly consistent
patterns are most often observed when the input variables
are highly correlated, and consequently, people will tend to
have greater confidence in predictions based on correlated
input variables. [Ref- 13]
15

Their conclusions were based in par- on an experi-
ment in which they asked subjects to predict grade- poin^
average en the basis of two pairs of aptitude tests.
Subjects were told that one pair of tests was highly corre-
lated, while the other pair of tests was not correlated.
For half of the subjects, the labels of the correlated and
the uncorrelated pairs of tests were reversed. Subjects
were also told that "all tests were found equally successful
in predicting college performance." The results revealed
that subjects were mere confident in predicting from the
correlated tests, over the entire range of predicted scores;
that is, they were mere confident in a context of inferior
predictive validity. [Ref. 14]
Tversky and Kahneman refer to the unwarranted confi-
dence that is produced by a good fit between the predicted
outcome and the input information as the "illusion of
validity." They suggest that this illusion persists even
when people are aware of the factors that limit the accuracy
of their predictions.- [Ref. 15]
A fundamental idea underlying probability theory is
that the prior probabilities that summarize what is known
about a problem before receiving specific, individuating
evidence continue to be relevant even after such evidence
has teen obtained. Specifically, Bayes 1 rule provides for a
multiplicative relation between prior odds and the odds with
new information. Kahneman and Tversky concluded that their
subjects failed to integrate prior probabilities with
specific evidence and that this failure was one of the most
significant departures of intuition from the normative
Eayesian approach. [Bef- 16]
2 . Availability
There are situations in which people assess the
frequency of a class or the probability of an event by the
16

ease with which instances cr occurrences can be brought to
mind. This judgmental heuristic is called availability.
[Ref. 17]
In life, instances cf frequent events are typically
easier to recall than instances of less frequent events, and
likely occurrences are usually easier to imagine than
unlikely ones. Thus availability is often a valid cue for
the assessment of frequency and probability. However, since
availability is also affected by subtle factors unrelated to
likelihood, such as familiarity, recency, and emotional
saliency, reliance on it may result in systematic biases.
If examples are brought to mind quickly, it can be
assumed that there must be a lot of them, or that if an
association is easily made, then it must be accurate, since
associative bonds are built with experience. Furthermore,
it is ease of retrieval, construction, and association that
provides the estimate of frequency or probability, not the
sum total cf examples or associations that come to mind.
Thus, one important difference between the use of the avail-
ability heuristic and the use of some more elaborate infer-
ential process is that little actual retrieval or
construction need be completed; an estimate cf the ease with
which this process would be performed is sufficient as a
basis for inference. £Ref. 18]
To seme extent the assumptions regarding the rela-
tionship between ease of construction or retrieval and
numbers cf examples cr associations are accurate, and to the
extent that they are, an individual using the availability
heuristic will reach correct inferences or at least infer-
ences that match these reached by using more exhaustive
procedures. Under other circumstances, however, these
inferences may not be accurate because there are biases in
the available data that are brought to bear on the problem.
17

When the size of a class is judged by the avail-
ability of its instances, a class whose instances are easily
retrieved will appear more numerous than a class of equal
frequency whose instances are less retrievable. In an
elementary demonstration of this affect, subjects heard a
list of well-known personalities of both sexes and were
subsequently asked to judge whether the list contained more
names of men than of women. Different lists were presented
to different groups of subjects. In soma of the lists the
men were relatively more famous than the wom^n, and in
ethers -he women were relatively mora famous than the men.
In each of the lists, the subjects erroneously judged that
the class that had the more famous perscnalitites was the
more numerous. [Ref. 19]
In addition to familiarity, there are other factors,
such as salience, which affect the retrievability of
instances. The impact of seeing a house burning on the
subjective probability of such accidents is probably greater
than the impact of reading about a fire in the local paper.
Furthermore, recent cccurrences are likely to be relatively
more available than earlier occurrences. It is a common
experience that the subjective probability of traffic acci-
dents rises temporarily when one sees a car overturned by
the side cf the road. [ Bef . 20]
Scmetimes one has to assess the frequency of a class
whose instances are not stcred in memory but can be gener-
ated according to a given rule. In such situations, one
typically generates several instances and evaluates
frequency or probability by the ease with which the relevant
instances can be constructed. However, the ease of
constructing instances does not always reflect their actual




Imaginabilit y also plays an important role in the
evaluation of probabilitie s in real-life situations. The
risk involved in an adventurous expedition, for example, is
evaluated hy imagining contingencies with which the expe-
dition is net equipped to cope. If many such difficulties
are vividly portrayed, the expedition can be made to appear
exceedingly dangerous, although the ease with which disas-
ters are imagined need not reflect their actual likelihood.
Conversely, the risk involved in an undertaking may be
grossly underestimated if some possible dangers are either
difficult tc conceive of, or simply do not come to mind.
[Ref. 22]
Experience has taught us that, in general, instances
of large classes are recalled better and faster .than
instances of less freguent classes; that likely occurrences
are easier to imagine than unlikely ones; and that the asso-
ciative connections between events are strengthened when the
events frequently cc-occur. As a result, man uses the
availability heuristic for estimating the frequency of a
class, the likelihood of an event, or the frequency of
co-occurrences, by the ease with which the relevant mental
operations of retrieval, construction, or association can be
performed. Under seme circumstances, use of the avail-
ability heuristic leads to perfectly appropriate conclu-
sions; however, under those circumstances where there is a
bias in what information is available, faulty inferences
follow.
3 • Anchoring and Adjus tment
Ancther errcr-prone heuristic is anchoring and
adjustment. With this process, a natural starting point or
anchor is used as a first approximation to the judgment.
The initial value, or starting point, may be suggested by
the formulation of the problem, may be based on historical
19

data, or may be the result of a partial computation. In any
case, adjustments are typically insufficient in that they
fall short of the actual final answer. Different starting
points yield different estimates, which are biased toward
the initial values. [Ref. 23]
In a demonstration of the anchoring effect, subjects
were asked to estimate various quantities, stated in
percentages. For each quantity, a number between and 100
was determined by spinning a wheel of fortune in the
subjects' presence. The subjects were instructed to indi-
cate first whether that number was higher or lower than the
value of the quantity, and then to estimate the value of the
quantity ty moving upward or downward from the given number.
Different groups were given different numbers for each quan-
tity, and these arbitrary numbers had a marked effect on
estimates. For example, the median estimates of the
percentage of African countries in the United Nations were
25 and 45 for groups that received 10 and 65, respectively,
as starting points. Fayoffs for accuracy did not reduce the
anchoring effect.
Anchoring occurs not only when the starting point is
given to the subject, but also when the subject bases his
estimate en the result of seme incomplete computation. A
study of intuitive numerical estimation illustrates this
effect. Two groups of high school students estimated,
within 5 seconds, a numerical expression that was written on
the blackboard. One group estimated the product
8x7x6x5x4x3x2x1




To rapidly answer such questions, people may perform a few
steps of computation and estimate the product by extrapola-
tion or adjustment. Because adjustments are typically
insufficient, this procedure should lead to underestimation.
Furthermore, because the result of the first few steps of
multiplication (performed from left to right) is higher in
the descending sequence than in the ascending sequence, the
former expression should be judged larger than the latter.
Both predictions were confirmed. The median estimate for
the descending sequence was 2250, while the median estimate
for the ascending seguence was 512. The correct answer is
40,320. [Bef. 24]
In a study by Bar-Hillel subjects were given the
opportunity to bet en one of two svents. Three types of
events were used: (1) simple events, such as drawing a red
marble from a bag containing 50 percent red marbles and 50
percent white marbles; (2) conjunctive evsnts, such as
drawing a red marble seven times in succession, with
replacement, from a bag containing 90 percent red marbles
and 10 percent white marbles; and (3) disjunctive events,
such as drawing a red marble at least once in seven succes-
sive tries, with replacement, from a bag containing 10
percent red marbles and 90 percent white marbles. In this
problem, a significant majority of subjects preferred to bet
on the conjunctive event, the probability of which is .48,
rather than on the sittple event, the probability of which is
.50. Subjects also preferred to bet on the simple event
rather than on the disjunctive event, which has a prob-
ability cf .52. Thus, most subjects bet on the less likely
event in both comparisons. This pattern of choices illus-
trates that people tend to overestimate the probability of
conjunctive events and to underestimate the probability of
disjunctive events. These biases are readily explained as
effects cf anchoring. [ Raf . 25]
21

Eias€£ in the evaluation of compound events are also
significant in the context: of planning and forecasting. The
successful completion of an undertaking typically has a
conjunctive character: for the undertaking to succeed, each
of a series of events must occur. Even when each cf these
events is very likely, the overall probability of success
can be quite low if the number of events is large. The
general tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunc-
tive events leads to unwarranted optimism in the evaluation
of the likelihood that a plan will succeed or that a project
will be completed on time. Conversely, disjunctive struc-
tures are typically encountered in the evaluation of risks.
[Ref. 26]
** • Aspiration Le vel
A related concept that may effect the direction and
magnitude cf adjustment from a given starting point is that
of aspiration level. The term "level of aspiration" was
introduced into the literature in Germany by T. Demto in
1930. Bembo hypothesized that the presence of a particular
level of aspiration determined whether or not people felt
satisfied or dissatisfied with themselves after performance
of a task. Since that time numerous studies have supported
Dembo's contention. Lewin reported that when first exposed
to a level of aspiration situation subjects set an initial
level of aspiration higher than their previous performance
score and tend to keep it positive under most conditions.
He also showed that success and failure directly affect the
level cf aspiration which is raised and lowered in accor-
dance with the attained or unattained level of the
preceeding performance. [Ref. 27]
In conjunction with Dembo, Lewin created an
aspiration- level model to explain their findings. It
included the following propositions:
22

1. In the steady stats, aspiration level exceeds
achievement by a small amount.
2. When achievement increases a- an increasing rate,
aspiration level will exhibit, short-run lags behind
achievement.
3. When achievement decreases, aspiration level will
be above achievement
.
4. Over time, aspiration levels tend to adjust to the
level of achievement.
These propositions derive from a set of assumptions
requiring that current aspiration be an optimistic extrapo-
lation of past achievement and past aspirations. Although
such assumptions are sometimes inappropriate, the model
seems to be consistent with a wide range of human gcal
setting behavior. [Ref. 28]
C. CCHCIDSION
Numerous studies h.ave replicated and extended the
Kahneman and Tversky studies, and others have independently
arrived at similar conclusions. The r epresstativeness
heuristic has received the most attention. Wise and
Mockovak and [Ref. 29] and Bar-Hillel [Ref. 30] have docu-
mented the importance of similarity structures in prob-
ability judgment. Like Kahneman and Tversky, [Ref- 31]
Marks and Clarkson, [Ref. 32] and Svenson [Ref. 33] observed
that subjects 1 posterior probabilities were predominantly
influenced by the icst representative aspect in a sample.
Contrary to the normative model, population proportion and
sample size were relatively unimportant. Leon and Anderson
[Ref. 34] did find an influence of these two characteristics
and, as a result, claimed that Kahneman and Tversky«s
subjects must have misunderstood the task. Ward, however,
argued that the conflicting results were most likely due to
23

differences in the tasks, rather than to misinterpretation
of instructions. Hammerton, [Ref. 35] Lyon and Slovic
[Ref. 36] have replicated Kahnamen and Tversky's [Ref- 37]
finding that subjects neglect population base rates when
judging the probability that an individual belongs to a
given category. Additional evidence for representativeness
comes from studies by Brickman and Fierce, [Ref- 38]
Hclzworth and Doherty, [Ref. 39] and Lichtenstein , 2arle and
Slovic. [Ref. 40]
Availability and anchoring have been studied less often.
Evidence of availability bias has been found by Slcvic,
Fishhoff and Lichtenstein. [Ref. 41] Anchoring has been
hypothesized to account for the affects of response mode
upon tet preferences, and it has bean proposed as a method
that people use to reduce strain when making rational judg-
ments. Pitz [Ref. 42] gave the anchoring heuristic a key
role in his mod=l describing hew people craate subjective
probability distributions f cr imperfectly known or uncertain
quantities.
A heuristic approach tc the study of man's ability to
assess subjective probabilities differs somewhat from the
normative Bayesian approach that underlies most applications
of modern decision theory. The normative approach tends to
focus cr. the quasticn "how should people evaluate uncer-
tainty?" Considerable research has concentrated on ascer-
taining how people's judgments deviate from the ' Bayesian
model. However, the usefulness of the normative approach to
the analysis and modeling cf subjective probability depends
not only on the accuracy cf the subjective estimates but
also en the extent tc which the normative model captures the
essential determinants of the judgment process. A heuristic
approach tries to fecus on these determinants directly by
posing the question "how do people evaluate uncertainty?"
Heuristics such as representativeness, availability, and
24

anchoring are probably adopted because they are useful in
reducing the complex tasks of assessing probabilities to
simpler judgmental operations.
As noted in the introduction behavioral decision theory
postulates -hat perscr.al judgment follows certain patterns.
The studies, however, have largely been concerned with indi-
viduals. Many impcrtar.t judgments are made in organiza-
tional settings where psychological patterns are complicated
by organizational pressures. The next two chapters deal
with data from two separate organizations in two different
environments. The judgmental processes of forecasting
future organizational budgets and outcomes are examined to
discover if any of the psychological phenomena discussed
above can te observed.
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III. THE NAVI STOCKFUND
A. BACKGBCOHD
The Navy Stock Fund exists for the purchase and holding
of numerous supply items which are then "sold" to a
customer. The Fund is ultimately "paid" remuneration for
requisition? supply items through the customer's legislated
appropriation 1
Because of the diversity and tremendous number of prod-
ucts controlled by the Fund, which varies from food to avia-
tion parts to fuel, and because of the enormous size of the
Fund (over $6 billicc in New Customer orders expected for
FY-83) the Stock Fund has bean split into eight Budget
Projects each of which is headed by a separate Project
Manager. Table I lists the Budget Projects which comprise
the Navy Stock Fund.
Each Budget Project Manager has the responsibility of
building his own budget which is then aggregated by the Navy
Supply Systems Ccmmar.d, submitted to the senior levels of
the Department of Defense, reviewed by the Office of
Management and Budget and ultimately becomes a portion of
the overall defense tudget which is to be approved by the
Congress each September for the upcoming fiscal year. Along
with the budget proposals for the next year, managers must
also provide forecasts for the subsequent fiscal year. It
is upon the relationship between the approved budgets and
these forecasts that this analysis is based.
iThe fund isolates particular activities and operations
to permit management to better control these activities by
treating them as if they were separate entities. For an in
depth discussion of federal budget policy and appropriation
procedures see Lelocp, L. Budgetary Politi cs Brunswick,
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E. ABALITICAL STRUCTURE
The basic analysis focuses or. four of the Budget
Projects: 14- Ship's Parts, 21- Commissary Stores, 38-
Fuels, and 81- Repairables. Each was chosen because it is
differs from the others in many respects. Each has its own
distinct market within the Navy community, and, conse-
quently, each manager has a unique set of problems involved
in forecasting. within the four Budget Projects four
elements of the budget were compared:
1. New Material Orders— These are orders from a Navy
customer for material needed to support Naval opera-
tions
2. Obligations-- These are contracts let by the managers
of the Stock Fund to contractors for the purchase of
goods or services.
3. Disbursements— These are payments of cash to private
suppliers for goods and sevices and generally lag
contracts by several months.
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4. Inventories-- These are the cash value placed on the
material in stock for issue.
Each Budget Project is examined separately and it was
expected that different results could be forthcoming from
the different projects. Quarterly figures listing current
budgets and forecasts for the next year provided the data
needed. Theses figures were analyzed to see what patterns,
if any, may be present in the budgetary forecasts. The data
was taken from annual "Navy Stock Fund Report and
Reappcrticnment Request" for the fiscal years 198 1 to 1983
inclusive. The raw data (presented in Appendix A) was
converted into ratios for ease of analysis and explanation.
The analysis consists of two phases. Firstly, the approved
budget for a given year (say year t) is compared to the
accompanying forecast for the next year (year t+1) . This
was done by computing the ratio of Forecast (t+1 ) /Budget (t)
quarter by quarter fcr the entire three year period. This
number was then further adjusted to account for the expected
rate of inflation for the year t+1. This was done by multi-
plying the ratio by an expected inflation index. 2 The
results than provide a growth rate corrected fcr inflation.
Fcr example, if the ratio is 1.00 all of the forecasted
budget change is the result of inflation alone and no growth
is present. If it is ever 1.00 "growth" has been forecast.
If the ratio is less than 1.00 "shrinkage" has been
predicted. This operation has bean named Phase I analysis.
All Phase I numbers in the subsequent tables are the infla-
tion adjusted ratios of the forecast for next year to the
budget fcr this year.
2 Shcrt Term predictions of inflation are listed yearly
by CMB and publicized in suppliments ot annual budget
reports. The inflation rates used in the ratio model were:
FY-81 10.4%; FY-82 7.2%; FY -83 5.6%.
28

Secondly, Phase II analysis is concerned with an exami-
nation of the accuracy of each manager's forecasts. This is
accomplished by comparing the old forecast with the subse-
quent approved budget. That is, the forecast for the budget
for year (t) that was prepared in year (t-1) is compared to
the actual approved budget for year (t) . A ratio of
Forecast : Budget is computed. In this instance a ratio of
1.00 reflects 100% accuracy in forecasting by the Project
Manager while a result higher than 1.00 indicates a forecast
which was higher than the subsequent budget, and a result of
less than 1.00 indicates when the old forecast is less than
the approved budget. In Phase II, for example, a comparison
is made between a forecast for FY-82 dated 15 September 1980
and a budget approved for FY-82 dated 15 September 1981.
The analysis concerns itself with a search for patterns in
the prediction habits of the different managers. Attempts
will be made to bring out any possible biases which may have
effected the forecasting process.
1 . E udqet Project 1 4- Ships Par t
s
Budget Project 14 covers the large number of consu-
mable items which are used in the support of ordnance, elec-
tronic and other shipboard equipment. The Project Manager
is responsible for the procurement and distribution of
approximately 300,000 different items.
With the exception of the Obligations category,
almost all of the forecasts are larger than the respective
budgets over the three year period. The after inflation
growth cf New Material Orders was forecast to be slight
throughout FY-82 but then a jump to 120% of budget was fore-
cast for FY-83. This growth rate then fell back to approxi-
mately 110% growth forecast for FY-84. The same kind of

























































0. 85 1.02 1.12
0.83 0.50 1 .06
0.82 1.62 1 .04
0.86 1.02 1 .06
0.81 1.27 1 .19
0.81 1.27 1 .12
0.84 1.27 1 .13
0.87 1.27 1 .13
1.24 1.12 1.24
1. 20 1.12 1 .22
1. 16 1.12 1.20
1. 17 1.12 1 .19
0.82 0.64 0.75
0.38 0.51 0.72
0. 55 1.30 0.72
0.61 0.97 0.74
0.54 1.05 1.16
1.23 1.05 1 .14
0.85 1.05 1.11
0.85 1.05 1.09
to 127% fcr FY-83 and consequently fell back to 112$ for the
next year. Both of these observations might be the
cutgrcwth cf a mixture of the heuristic properties of
Representativeness and Aspiration Levels.
To bear this postulaticn cut, the Phase II figures
must, be examined. It is clear that in all four categories
the forecasted figures were substantially below the approved
budget fcr FY-82, which simply means that the Project
Manager- on 15 September, 1980-predicted a budget fcr FY-82
which turned out to be only about 85£ of the approved FY-82
budget which was granted on 15 September 1981. The question
of why this is sc may be answered by carefully examining the
timing of the forecasts and the environment within which
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they were made. Ir September of 1980 the nation was
involved in a presidential election race which, supposedly,
was tc be one of the closest of recent times. The incum-
bent, Mr. Carter, was not known for advocating any major
growth in Defense spending. His opponent, on the ether
hand, readily promoted growth in military spending. The
forecast, of 15 September 19 80 was made while Mr. Carter was
still firmly in charge of the White House and apparently
reflected the Administration's views of consumable parts
requirements for the Navy for two years hence. The ac-ual
budget apprcved during the Reagan administration was signif-
icantly higher than anticipated during the Carter adminis-
tration. The budget approved on 15 September 198 1 indicates
an average increase of 16% over the old forecast in New
Material Crders, 4 1$ in Obligations, 15% in Disbursements,
and 27% in Inventories. (See Table II, Phr.se II.)
The aspiration level phenomenon can be clearly seen
in the budget forecast for the next year (Table II, Phase I
FY-82) as the predicted real growth for New Material Orders
for FY-83 was a whopping 21%. The same can be said for
Disbursements and Inventories where growth was forecasted to
be 27% and 12% respectively after inflation. The aspiration
level effect has contributed to the creation of a forecast
which predicts considerable growth relative to past fore-
casts and, as it turns out, to subsequent forecasts as well.
This prediction came at a time when the first Reagan budget
had been pushed through Congress creating a perception that
over the next four years there would be a substantial growth
in the number of ships in the 0. S. Fleet. This perception
was futher fostered when the Administration took steps to
reactivate the OSS New Jersey and the USS Iowa. Thus, it
was a natural outgrowth of such thought to perceive expan-
sion in this Budget Project and to forecast it.
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Another indication of aspiration levels at work here
is the fact that FY-63 forecasts were high compared to the
approved budget for FY-83. (Table II, Phase II, FY-83. ) In
the case of New Material Orders the forecast overshot the
approved budget by 388 in the fourth quarter and experienced
an average forecasting error of about 23% over the entire
year. Inventories averaged 12.75% high while Disbursements
were closer with only a 5.2% average error. The forecasts
for the fcllcwing year reflect these errors as the aspira-
tion level effect seems to have been dampened rather
quickly. Forecasted real growth in New Material Orders and
Disbursements fell tc approximately 12% of the approved
budget from their peviously discussed highs. The forecasted
levels of Inventories and Obligations actually grew for the
next year. (Phase I FY-83.)
For two years, FY-82 and 83, forecasted Obligations
were running between 80 and 87% of the approved budget.
(Table II, Phase I FY-81, 82.) However, Phase II data from
the same period show that these forecasts were well below
the actual budget for both years. Acting on this informa-
tion, it would seem appropriate for a project manager to
expect future Obligations tc grow in a like manner. Given
the manager had just obtained much more than he expected, it
can be hypcthezed that his aspiration level rose and that he
would forecast such growth in the next budget also. This
actually happened as the next forecast rose from 17% below
budget to 19!? above budget. (Phase I, FY-82, 83.)
The continued forecasted growth in Inventories might
be a natural function of the accounting structure rather
than the result of a heuristic bias. For three years the
levels of New Materials and Disbursements has been rising as
has the Inventories Budget. If these materials were brought
into the Stock Fund but net used right away by the customers
then one would expect the levels of inventory to rise
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accordingly. Unfortunately, data is not available-o ascer-
tain the accuracy of the latest predicted rise in
Inventories
.
2 • Eudqet Pro je ct 2 J[ 2 Co mraiss ar y_ and Shi£ S tores
Eudget Project 21 includes foodstuffs and ether
consumable items which are stocked at Navy-owred commissary
stores throughout the world. The commissary may be likened
to supermarkets having three resale departments- groceries,
meats, and produce. The manager of this Budge* Project is
responsible for over 3500 seperate items.
TABLE III
Bad get Project - 21 Ratios
PHASE I





81-1 0.98 1. 00 0.98 0.99
2 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.99
3 0.99 1.00 0.97 0.99
4 C.98 1.00 1.01 0.97
8 2- 1 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
2 0.99 0. 99 1.00 1 .00
3 0.98 1.07 0.98 1 .01
4 1.03 1.04 1.03 1 .00
8 3-1 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.99
2 1.03 1.04 1.04 1 .00
3 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.99
4 1.02 1.01 1.06 0.99
PHASE II
82-1 0.99 1. 06 1.05 0.95
2 0.99 0. 92 0.93 0.95
3 1.02 1.02 1.03 0.96
4 1.06 1.08 1.08 0.94
8 3-1 0.99 0.97 0.97 1.00
2 1.02 1.05 1.06 1 .00
3 1.04 1. 17 1.06 1.01
4 1.09 1.05 1.10 1.02
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After examining this Budget Project, the existence
of forecasting biases cannot readily be seen. Instead, is
presented a set of uniquely stable data wherein the fore-
casts are surely based upon the predicted inflation rates
almost exclusively. In all four categories Phase I data
shows the ratio of forecast to budget (adjusted fcr infla-
tion) to be quite close to 1.00. In addition, the forecasts
are extremely close to the amounts budgeted in subsequent
years
.
In all four categories the budgets were within 10%
cf the previous forecasts and in most cases well within 5%,
That this can happen in an environment in which product
lines are constantly changing, where the number of potential
customers continues to grow, where there is competition with
the civilian community, and where managers may be using
different inflation indexes than are used here may seem to
te somewhat disconcerting. However, as explained by the
Project Manager in his annual statement for FY-83, "Since
the Current and past two years' sales have approximated the
inflationary rates for those periods the commissary store
sales increases for the next three fiscal years have been
predicted at the expected inflation rates with no real sales
growth anticipated." [Ref. 43 ]
Here, the behavioral heuristics discussed earlier
can readily be appreciated. Given the fact that the past
three years' worth of data have reflected growth rates
almost equal to the inflationary rates existing during the
periods, a very high probability has been assigned to the
possitility of future developments following the same
pattern. In this case it is evident that an "Anchor and
Adjust" effect exists wherein the present budget is simply
incrementally adjusted by the expected inflation rate in
order to arrive at the forecast for the next year. However,
the fact that Phase II analysis shows a remarkable rate of
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accuracy in the forecasts vis-a-vis the resultant budgets,
some of the dominant characteristics of the anchor and
adjust effect as developed by Slovic and Liechtenstein
[Ref. Sscrusgd] are net present. Their analysis deter mined
that tiases resulting from an anchor and adjust effect typi-
cally caused insufficient adjustments which, in this case,
should have forecasts to have been lower than the subsequent
budgets ar.d therefore, the Phase II ratios to be less than
1.00.
In this case, we have an adjustment factor that is
provided to the manager from the outside—one which is,
consequently, free of any bias on on his part. Thus we can
see the anchor and adjust effect without the presence of
some of the detrimental factors normally associated with it.
3. Budget Project 3 8 - Retail Fuels
Eudget Project 38 includes the purchase and usage of
bulk fuel and related items in support of U. S. Navy
requirements. The manager of this Project is responsible
for 64 different line items.
Once again, within this Budget Project the fore-
casting method appears to be extremely close to a simple
adjustment for inflation. In each of the four categories
over the course of three years the adjusted ratio cf fore-
cast to budget (phase I) was essentially 1.00 (with the
exception cf Inventories which was approximately 1.15 for
FY81-82). This, of course, may well indicate another
project that is very stable (i.e., there is no real growth)
and in which the manager expects that the Project will just
keep up with inflation.
What is different about Budget Project 38, however,
is that Phase II analysis indicates that the accuracy of the
forecasting is not nearly as good as 3udget 21. In FY 82




Budget Project- 38 fiatios
PHASE I
FY/ New Mat. Oblig . Disburse. I nv er_
QTR Orders
81-1 0.99 0.99 1.01 1.14
2 1.07 1.03 1.06 1.15
3 0.95 0.95 1.01 1.16
4 1.00 1.04 0.98 1.16
8 2- 1 1.05 1.00 1.00 1 .00
2 0.99 1.04 0.98 1 .00
3 0.98 0.96 0.96 1 .00
a 1.0 1 0.99 0.99 1 .00
8 3- 1 1.03 1.00 0.93 0.93
2 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 0.95 1.04 1.04 1 .00
4 0.96 0.99 0.99 1.00
PHASE II
8 2-1 1.02 0.97 0.95 0.97
2 0.96 1.01 0.97 0.98
3 0.96 0. 93 0.98 0.98
a 1.02 1.01 1.03 0.98
83-1 1.12 1.09 1.02 1.11
2 1.21 1. 14 1.07 1 .18
3 1.03 1.09 1.09 1 .19
4 1.01 1.07 1.07 1 .20
all fcur categories but in 1983 the previously forecasted
levels were all above the approved budget with Inventories
as much as 17% high. This indicates that there are forces
at work within the fuels area (such as a reduction of the
price of fuel) which have not been addressed in the fore-
casts. It becomes apparent then that continued reliance on
such an approach to forecasting for this budget project has
led tc forecasting iraccuracies as reflected in Phase II
analysis. This has led to a situa-ion in which a prediction
of no real growth has been made when actually a shrinkage of
the level of activity has occurred for the budget project.
In the face of this, continued forecasting methods based
solely upon predicted inflation rates may very well disguise
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the actual dynamics of the budget project and lead to
further inaccuracies in the future.
4 . Budget Project 8J, 2 Depot La vel Rep airab las
This budget project is unique in that it has only
been in existence since 1 April, 1981 as part of a three
year test program concerning the financing of the repair of
certain material elements of naval systems and subsystems.
The project controls line items within the following spec-
trum:
1. Shipboard hull, mechanical and electrical spares and
repair parts;
2. Gun and guided missile fire control and launching
systems and surface radar repair parts;
3. Surface to air guided missile repair parts;
4. Surface and underwater ordnance repair parts;
5. Electronic repair parts; and
6. Aviation repair parts.
Unfortunately, because of the short life of Budget
Project 81, less data are available than for the previous
tudget projects. This hampers the analysis to some degree.
What is readily apparent, however, is the difficulty
inherent in making accurate forecasts in the early life of
an organization. In Phase I analysis, growth is predicted
in all four categories but there appears to be no correla-
tion among the categories in the first year of the program.
In New Material Orders alone the predicted growth rate for
FY82-83 changes from 85% to 4 19% in two quarters. Forecasts
in the second year continue to predict growth but in this
instance the predicted levels for each category are more in
line with cne another and guarterly forecasts appear to be
more stable while still predicting a 30% growth rate.
Phase II analysis is quite limited because of the





Budget Project - 81 Batios
PHASE I
FY/ New Mat. Oblig . Disburse. Invent.
QTE Crders
82-1 1.81 1.64 4.83 1 .03
2 0.86 1. 17 3.80 1.04
3 1.31 1.00 1.43 1.05
4 4.19 1. 25 1.66 1 .05
8 3- 1 1.34 1.54 1.38 1 .12
2 1.29 1. 46 1.36 1.17
3 1.31 1.41 1.28 1 .21
4 1.31 1. 39 1.19 1 .25
PHASE II
83-1 1.24 1. 01 1.19 0.85
2 1.28 0.88 1. 18 0.85
3 1.31 1.01 1.10 0.85
4 1.31 1. 10 1.02 0.85
83 were well above the subsequently approved budget in all
four categories except Inventories where the forecast was
only 85% of the approved budget. Once again, the data are
unstable and the degree of accuracy of the forecasts ?v«r. in
the second year is marginal and differs for each category.
The over estimation cf these three categories, New Material
Orders, Obligations, and Disbursements might point to an
aspiration level effect but this phenomencm is unsupported
fcy Inventories (although Phase I analysis does, indeed,
predict a real growth rate of 20% for Inventories which
later turned out to be actually more like 35%) .
C. C0BCI0SIGBS
As can be seen from examining the different budget
projects, predicting future growth for the entire Navy Stock
Fund is a monumental task frought with many opportunities
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for the introduction of subjective biases. Analyzing jus-
half of the eight budget projects has exposed the possible
presence of a number of behavioral biases affecting the
final outcome of a budgetary forecast and ultimately
reducing the accuracy of that forecast. In Budget Project
14 the manager is seen forecasting rapid growth based upon
the information that the previous forecast was below the
authorized budget only to see the subseguent budget come in
well telcw his inflated forecast.
In the next budget project (21), a well established
stable program, the manager's forecasts are based solely
upon one parameter (inflation) and surprisingly enough,
these forecasts have proven to be guite accurate. This
accuracy is maintained for eight consecutive quarters which
lends creditability to such forecasting methods in this
particular case. However, in th.3 next budget project (38)
which is just as established as the previous one, the iden-
tical process of forecasting introduced biases into the
process. Lastly, is introduced a very new budget project
whose forecasts bring out quite clearly just how unstable a
decision makers predictions can become in the face of a
high degree of uncertainty. Here, very optimistic
predictions are the rule. Not having any historical base
upon which to establish any prior probabilities at all can
certainly contribute to the problems decision makers face in
making accurate, meaningful forecasts of future growth.
All of these budget projects - with the notable excep-
tion of Budget Project 21 - have experienced inaccuracies in
the forecasting of future budgets. The tendency has been
for the error to be en the high side - that is, forecasted
growth was higher than subsequent actual budgetary growth.
This was not the case in FY 82 for Budget Project 14 but in
the following year the budget was over-forecast by ar.
average of 6%. Budget Project 38 was ever-forecast by an
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average of 5% and Budget Project 81 by an average cf 6.555.
In each case, predictions were subject to different biases
which contributed to the overall inaccuracies of forecasting
of the budgets of the four major budget projects which make





The second section of the analysis is related to a firm
within the private sector. As before, forecasts are exam-
ined along with the corrections to the forecasts to deter-
mine what patterns if any, exist.
The data used in this chapter have been provided by a
large industrial corporation in the northeastern United
States which is a high technology manufacturer of specialty
steel and related products. It is organized into three
groups which operate, for the most part, as independent
production, sales and profit centers. The data used here
were collected from one of the groups which is referred to
as "Corporation A". It is a wholly owned subsidiary which
manufactures specialty steel products.
Corporation A produces many forecasts, two of which are
studied here. Annually, Profit Plans are completed in
December for the following year. The Profit Plans are busi-
ness plans which include bo-h managerial plans and
financial/operating forecasts. Many of the operating fore-
casts are divided into monthly targets. These numbers are
both forecasts and objectives. They are supposed to be
realistic but are also used to judge performance.
The Profit Plans are critical documents in the corporate
planning process and, as such, evolve from a process which
involves operating managers, senior management at
Corporation A and the parent company all interacting in a
structured planning process.
Each month, reports are made to the corporate offices
stating performance compared to the Profit Plan targets and
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providing forecasts cf our puts for the subsequent: months.
The two forecasts analyzed here are the monthly forecasts
from the Profit Plan (PP) and the One-Month-Ahead- Update
from the monthly reports (MU).
B. AHALYSIS STBDCTOBE
The data used are forecasts of Tonnage Shipped and Sales
for each month over the four year period from January 1975
through December 1976. As in the previous chapter these
categories are treated independently. These particular
items were chosen because they ar? not strongly correlated.
There was an average backlog of three months or more for
crders during the period studied which made Sales and
Shipments independent forecasts for any given month.
The data in Table VI and VII consist of the Profit Plan,
One- H cut h-A head Update, the Actual Results and the differ-
ences between the forecasts and actual results. Table VI
lists the data month by month while Table VII com piles these
numbers into yearly averages for Tonnage Shipped. The sign
cf the difference is important. A difference with a posi-
tive sign indicates that the PP or MU exceeded the actual
results, whereas a difference with a negative sign means
that the actual totals were greater than the respective
plan. Tables VIII and IX accomplish the same task for
Sales.
1 • Ton nag e Shipped
Icoking at the actual column of Table VI cne
observes that the amount of steel shipped goes through three
phases. Throughout 1975 and into 1976 the shipments
decrease. In 1976 there is no real stability but a floor is
reached in July and shipments begin to increase after that
point. The final period is marked by growth (with a few
exceptions) throughout 1977 and 1978.
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As Table VI shows the actual shipments in 1975 were
well below the expectations of the Profit Flan. The Profit
Plan predicted a stable year with a decline of about 5% in
shipments in the second half of the year compared tc the
first half. As the actual results came in under the Profit
Plan, the Monthly Updates tended during the first quarter to
under estimate the aircunt of the decline. This tendency was
reversed during the final three quarters as the Monthly
Updates were consistently correcting the Profit Plan with a
revised forecast that overstated the actual amount of
shrinkage. Not only did the pattern change but the magni-
tude of the difference between the actual results and the
Monthly Update was greater in the direction of overstating
the decline. That is, as things continued to get worse
management chose to update the Profit Plan conservatively
predicting greater shortfalls than actually occurred in each
of the last five months of 1975.
This continued into 1976. The Profit Plan predicted
that the decline in shipments would bottom cut in May and
then gradually increase. In fact, shipments were sluggish
over the first seven months of 1976. Then in August ship-
ments began to increase, a trend which continued until
December. Although the Profit Plan had predicted this type
of occurrence it predicted higher shipments than were actu-
ally made.
The pattern of over correction in the Monthly Update
continued during the first two months of 1976 and the magni-
tude of the over correction continued to increase as well.
Then in March shipments suddenly increased. The Monthly
Update while predicting an increase to 26800 tons over
February's actual shipments of 22729 tons was still shcrt of
the Profit Plan forecast of 28400 tons. Actual shipments of
29987 tons were achieved. Thus, in this instance, the Profit




JAN 20400 22600 19622
FEB 19900 27500 25502
MAR 23100 31000 31489
APR 21500 29400 26521
MAY 23200 28500 27482
JUN 23800 29200 27830
JUL 217 22000 20022
AUG 21200 30000 30058
SEP 19900 2900 27599
OCT 20300 3C000 30992
NCV 20000 30000 31718
DEC 21800 27200 28783
1S78
JAN 314 9 31500 29241
FEB 29680 3C000 28883
MAR 3 2880 3 200 33706
APR 306 6 30000 30978
MAY 32560 35300 37056
JUN 30510 35000 33775
JUL 24720 28000 28793
AUG 314 33500 34593
SEP 29500 34000 31635
OCT 30520 34000 34840
NCV 28290 34500 32406





Tonnage Shipped by Month (in tons)
EROFIT MONTHLY DIFF DIFF
MTH PLAN UPDATE ACTUAL (PP-A) (MU-A)
197 5
JAN 31800 31800 31049 75 1 751
FEB 32250 29000 26143 6107 2857
MAR 32750 29000 28261 4489 739
AER 32500 28257 28326 4174 -69
MAY 32250 25338 24886 7364 452
JUN 30750 20000 20669 10081 -669
JUL 29800 20000 19756 10044 244
AUG 29400 20800 2 2719 6681 -1919
SEP 30600 25000 25987 46 13 -987
OCT 31500 23000 24798 6702 -1798
NCV 31800 20500 21524 10276 -1024
DEC 29000 18000 19904 9096 -1904
1976
JAN 25500 21500 22766 2734 -1266
FEB 26000 21000 22729 3271 -1729
MAR 28400 26800 29987 -1587 -3187
APR 31800 25000 22462 9338 2538
MAY 23500 23500 23016 484 484
JUN 26200 26500 27686 -1486 -1186
JUL 25900 23500 20546 5354 2954
AUG 28500 27000 25660 2840 1340
SEP 31800 25500 26084 5716 -584
OCT 29900 26000 25491 4409 509
NOV 29500 27000 29879 -379 -2879
























shipments dropped the Monthly Update remained high and for
the first time in eight months the Monthly Update forecasted
results that were greater than actual shipments.
In June and July the same sort of thing happened.
In June shipments increased again to 27686 tons. The Profit
Flan prediction of 26200 tons was slightly increased to
26500 tons by the Monthly Update , an adjustment which was
too small. In July as shipments dropped markedly from 27686
tons to 20546 tons, the Monthly Update brought the Profi 4:
Plan down from 2590C tons to 23500 tons which was almost
3000 tons short of the actual shrinkage. Thus in periods of
instability, that is, when there is no clear trend control-
ling actual shipments there appears to be a monthly pattern
wherein the Profit Plan also influences the Monthly Update
which may cause a tendency toward under correction.
In August the shippage rate rose over July's low and
this increase was stable ever the next two months. The
Monthly Update continued to under correct the Profit Plan in
August, and in the stable months of September and October
the Monthly Update predicted actual shipments almost
exactly. Then in November another rise in shipments
occurred and once again the Profit Plan was updated in the
wrong direction by the monthly forecast.
After a relatively inactive January in which only
19622 tons were shipped, shipments in 1977 were much higher
than in previous years. The Profit Plan did not predict
this as it was below the actual results in ten of the twelve
months of the year. As was true in 1976, when faced with
instability the forecasters had difficulty predicting accu-
rately. In January of 1977 as shipments fell the Monthly
Update predicted a rise of the Profit Plan from 20400 to
22600 tons.
As shipments continued to grow with some stability
over the course of the year another pattern developed in the
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relationship between the Profit Plan and the Monthly
Updates. As was previously mentioned, the Profit Plan was
low in throughout most of the year. The updated forecasts,
en the otter hand, were quite close to actual shipments as
the updated forecasts were within 5 % of actual results in
six of the months. What is notable though is that whin the
updates were in error they tended to be so on the high side,
that is, the update adjusted the Profit Plan to a number
that was above actual shipments. Once again, in the face of
instability inaccuracies were introduced. In July, for
example, shipments dropped way down to 20022 tons. The
Profit Plan, however, was corrected up from 21700 tons to
22000 tons.
Cver 1978 shipments continued to grow and reached
their highest point of the period. The Profit Plan
predicted this growth to some degree as the forecasts called
for considerably greater shipments than was forecasted for
1977. In ten of the twelve months, however these projec-
tions were under the actual results. Thus, while growth was
clearly forecast the amount of growth was understated by 7%
as shewn in Table VII.
During the first four months of 1978 the
Cne-Month-Ahead Update made adjustments to the Profit Plan
which were all in the wrong direction. The actual results
were below the Profit Plan forecasts in January and February
and above them in March and April. However, in each
instance, the Monthly Adjusted the Profit Plan away from the
actual shipments. It should be noted that in three of the
four months the Profit Plan was extremely close to the
actual rasults before it was adjusted inaccurately.
Cver the last eight months the Profit Plan was
consistently under actual shipments. The updated plans
became quite accurate and with the exception of the months
of September and November they predicted within 5% accuracy
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the actual shipments for the remainder of 1978. Hcwevar,
there was a pattern developed during these months, which was
if there were an inaccuracy it was from an overestimate of
what the actual shipments were going to be. In Sept ember
and November the Profit Plan under estimated actual amounts
by 2135 and 4116 tons respectively while the updated plans,




Average Tonnage S hipped (in tons)
YEAH PP ACTUAL DIFF. PERCENT
DIFF.
1975 31200 24502 6698 27.3
1976 27750 24979 2771 9
1977 21400 27302 -5902 -21.6
1976 2995 1 32 231 -2280 -7
Four Yr . Avg .
27 57 5
_
27 253 322 1.2
YEAH CPP ACTUAL DIFF. P2HCENT
DIFF.
1975 24 225 24 502 -277 -1.1
1976 24 6 92 24 979 -287 -1. 1
1977 28 03 3 27 30 2 731 2.7
1978 324 4 2 32231 211 0.7
I





As was noted earlier the Profit Plans are important
targets which management at all levels strives to achieve.
Table VII demonstrates just how inaccurate even the most
meticulously compiled plans may become in the face of envi-
ronmental instability. Table VIII shows a 1977 Plan that
predicted further shrinkage from the 1975 and 1976 plans
when the amount of material shipped rose significantly
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causing the yearly plan to te below actual outcomes by over
21%. Additionally, in the improving times such as 1978 when
shipments were steadily rising, the average forecast of the
Profit Plan while predicting growth, understated that growth
fcy 7%.
When considering the One-Month-Ahead updated clans
it appears that Corporation A is making the most out of
available information. When these forecasts have been in
error they have presented definite trends which provide
useful information concerning predictive biases. For
example, in 1978 when shipments were growing, there was a
clear pattern of predicting more growth than actually
occurred. It would appear that line managers were setting
high targets at the beginning of each month when things were
going well. On the other hand, when things were going
poorly (as concerns amount of material shipped) the pattern
was one of overstating the degree by which actual results
would fall short of the Profit Plan.
Cne other matter of note is the degree of accuracy
of the monthly updates. Even in the face of instability
such as in 1976 and 1977 the average error of these fore-
casts was, indeed, small as shown by Table VII.
Cn average, the Monthly Update is quite close to the
actual outcomes. In examining the Profit Plan itself,
though, seme of the theory presented in the literature is
illustrated. Between 197 5 and 1976 the actual amount of
tonnage shipped increased by only 2% and the 1976 Profit
Flan was adjusted down from 1975 to reflect this lack of
growth. However, the 1976 forecast was not adjusted suffi-
ciently, and the fcrecast remained significantly above
actual results.
In 1977, the Profit Plan really missed the mark.
While the Profit Plan predicted a further decline in ship-
ments (by about 17% below 1976) the actual number of tons
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shipped increased by 9. 3%. It appears that there was a
tendency to remain pessimistic ever, in the face of steadily
increasing figures over the last half of 1976.
For 1978 the Profit Flan predicted increased ship-
ments. Once more, however, the forecast was short of what
actually hapened. Here, as well as in 1975 and 1976 there
appears to by an Anchor and Adjust heuristic in effect. In
these periods, the Profit Plan forecasted accurately what
direction the amount of shippage was taking but the yearly
adjustments wta consistently short in each y=ar.
2 . Sal es
Sales are presented in terms of thousands of dollars
<$ x 1000) . As Table VIII shows sales fell well below the
Profit Plan in 1975. This trend continued into the first
seven months of 1976 and the recovery in sales did not tegin
until August of that year.
The Profit Plan for 1975 predicted sales of between
$14000 and $16000 over the course of the year. However,
this was an off year for steel and actual sales declined
steadily throughout the year. The monthly updates did no*
predict the severity of the decline until March. During
April and May the monthly updates did not adjust the Profit
Flan all the way dcwn to actual levels but they were,
indeed, close. Eeginning in June and continuing through the
year until December the monthly predictions gave projections
which were consistently more severe than the actual decline
in sales.
The sales slowdown went on into 1976 but the 1976
Profit Plan while lower than the 1975 Plan was still fore-
casting sales well above actual levels. The monthly updates
for the most part, continued along the same pattern as 1975.
However, in March sales suddenly jumped from $9306 in




Monthly Sales (x $1000)
PROFIT MONTHLY DIFF. DIFF.
Month ELAN UPDATE ACTUAL (PP-A) (MU-A)
1975
JAN 14413 14413 14885 -472 -472
FEB 14668 12919 11888 2780 1031
MAR 14956 13094 12602 2354 492
APR 15537 12240 12158 3379 82
MAY 15470 10883 10505 4965 378
JUN 14732 8578 8924 5808 -346
JUL 14650 8512 8629 6021 -117
AUG 14508 9020 9417 509 1 -397
SEP 15147 10396 10459 4688 -63
OCT 15754 9663 10132 5622 -469
NOV 15885 8873 9135 6750 -262
DEC 14546 7725 8529 6017 -804
1976
JAN 11459 8868 9428 2031 -560
FEB 11781 8814 9306 2475 -492
MAR 12839 11409 12494 345 -1085
APR 15007 10783 9703 5304 1080
MAY 15418 9776 9740 5678 36
JUN 12271 10779 12010 26 1 -1231
JUL 12451 9695 9513 2938 182
AUG 13247 11074 11803 1444 -729
SEP 15669 11825 12077 3592 -252
OCT 14612 12130 11975 2637 155
NOV 14508 13001 14047 46 1 -1046
DEC 12546 11032 11318 1228 -286
1977
JAN 13821 11273 9698 4123 1575
FEB 13353 13317 12174 1179 1143
MAR 15303 14872 15161 142 -289
APR 14870 14304 13157 1713 1147
MAY 15380 14423 13985 1395 438
JUN 15548 15135 14373 1175 762
JUL 13515 11874 10732 2783 1142
AUG 14861 15749 16826 -1965 -1077
SEP 14612 15680 14838 -226 842
OCT 15490 15944 16393 -903 -449
NOV 14741 15956 16727 -1986 -771














JAN 16729 167 17
FEB 15755 16216
MAR 18 139 18101
APR 16914 171 19
MAY 17949 19691
JUN 16874 185 95
JUL 13772 159 37
AUG 17 291 18849
SEP 16720 19778
OCT 17 28 9 196 97
















would increase (up tc $11409 from $88 14) but the adjustment
remained lew. During the next month sales once again fell
off and the updated projection, while predicting such an
occurrence, made an adjustment to the Profit Plan which was
still short of the actual decline in sales. An almost iden-
tical situation occurred in June when sales again jumped to
$12010.
Frcm August through December sales rose but remained
below the levels forecasted in the Profit Plan. The
One-Mcnth-Ahead Plans for these months were for the most
part fairly accurate. In the Month of November sales peaked
at $14861 and in this instance the monthly forecast was
considerably short predicting sales of $13001.
After a slow January, Sales began to pick up in 1977
and were greatly accelerated over the last five months of
the year. The Profit Plan for 1977 predicted such growth
but in eight of the twelve months the Plan remained above
actual sales. The monthly plans were rather inaccurate in
the menths cf January, February, July, and August. In the
first two months sales were down from the recovery realized
in the last part of 1976 and this fact was not predicted
closely in the monthly plans. Then sales recovered in
March- a fact which was reflected in the Monthly Update in
that month. Sales fell in April but the Monthly Update did
not predict this and the April forecast was toe high. As
Sales began to grow in the summer the accuracy of the
updated plans improved.
1978 was a record year for Sales at Corporation A.
The Profit Plan forecasted increases over 1977 but in eleven
months the Plan was below actual results. The Monthly
Updates missed the mark, in January, March, September and
November hut were extremely accurate in predicting Sales in
the other menths. In January just as had happened in past
years Sales fell from the closing highs of the last half of
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1977. The monthly adjustment made almost no change ro the
Profit Plan -and the result was an inaccurate prediction. In
March, Sales climbed to $19185 but the Monthly Update
adjusted the Profit ic the ether direction while predicting
Sales of $18101. Beth of the major inaccuracies at the end
cf the year were the result of the Monthly Update fore-
casting Sales far above the provisions of the Profit Plan.
Actual Sales were significantly greater than the Prcfit Plan
in both instances but did reach the levels predicted in the
monthly plans.
The deleterious effect of environmental instability
can be seen in sales forecasts just as in shipments. It
seemed that each January sales activtiy would drop off from
the rather comfortable levels of the end of the previous
year and that each March sale would peak for some reason
only to fall back to previous levels in April. In all four
years this occurrence adversely effected the accuracy of the
latest forecast. Another phenomena which concerns the
updated forecasts is that the monthly inaccuracies described
above tended to cancel each other out and on average, as
demonstrated in Table IX, the One-Month-Ahead Plans were
extremely accurate.
During 1975-1976 (just as was true with shipments)
the Profit Plan forecasted higher sales than actually
occurred. In 1977 the Profit Plan predicted a growth in
sales over 1976 levels and this forecast, while high, was
within H.1% of actual sales. In 1978 continued sales growth
was forecast but this time the forecast lagged actual sales
growth by 9.3%.
It also appears that an Anchor and Adjust effect is
at work here. The Profit Plan was adjusted in the correct
direction each year and the amount adjusted consistently




Average Sales (x $1000)
YEAR PP ACTUAL DIFF. PERCENT
DIFF
1975 15022 10605 +4417 +41.6
1976 13484 11113 +2366 +21.3
1977 14756 14093 663 4.7
1978 16566 18257 -1691 -9.3
Four Yr . Avq.






YEAR CP? DIFF. PERCENT
DIFF.
1975 10526 -79 -0.7
1976 10766 -352 -3.2
1977 14412 319 2.3
1978 18266 9 0.0
Four Yr. Avg.
13492 13518 -26 -0.2
As was true ccncerning shipments the One- Month-Ahead
Plan reflects an extremely slight t.endancy for -he
forecaster to ever adjust. As shown by Table IX, the
percentage differences while almost negligible are all indi-
cative cf an over correction to the Profit. Plan.
3 • Conclusions
In both categories--Sales and Tonnage Shipped— the
presence cf the Anchcr and Adjust effect: seems to exist as
the Profit Plan is adjusted from year to year. In the 1977
forecast cf shipments, the Profit Plan was adjusted in the
wrong direction and, conseguently, completely missed what
actually transpired.
The presence of Anchcr and Adjustment can be indi-
cated when two criteria are satisified, although mere
complex formulations of the process are possible. Firstly,
the direction of the adjustment to the forecast must be in
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the in the correct direction. For example, the Monthly
Update must adjust the Profit Plan in the same direction
that actual results are taking in relation to the Profit
Plan. This indicates the forecaster has information in
addition to past forecasts and such information has seme
usefulness in predicting the future. Secondly, -he magni-
tude of the correction must be less than the magnitude of
the actual results. That is, the forecaster is anchored and
doesn't adjust far enough. To test for anchoring and
adjustment, the Monthly Updates in Tables VI and VIII which
met the first stipulation were identified. The forecast for
that month (Forecast for month t+1) was subtracted from the
actual for 'that month (month t) . The actual for the subse-
quent month (t+1) was subtracted from the actual of the
reference month (month t) . The absolute values of both
resultants were then compared. If the Anchor and Adjustment
heuristic is clearly dominant the first resultant should be
less than the second resultant. That is, the difference
between current and forecast values will be less than the
difference between current and future actual outcomes. When
the test was done it was found that it held 50X of the time
for shipments and 54?? of the time for sales. Thus, they
over-adjust just as cften as they under adjust which is not




This thesis investigates the ways in which man irakes
decisions in an organizational environment. This was done
in an attempt to discover aids :hai might contribute to
tetter decision making. A review of current literature in
the area of decision theory revealed two interesting facts.
First, researchers in the field of decision theory led by
Tversky and Kahneman argue that people rely en a limited
number of heuristic principles that reduce the complex tasks
of assessing subjective probabilities and predicting values
to simpler judgmental operations. Tversky and Kahneman
identify "representativeness," "availability," and
"anchoring and adjustment" as the three most common princi-
ples which decision makers employ in the course of
conducting business. The second finding is that research in
the field of decision theory has bsen conducted largely in
the area of individuals. No quantitative data could be
found indicating a dependence on heuristic principles by
decision makers in an organizational structure. If as
Tversky and Kahneman postulate, reliance on heuristics can
lead to substantial biases, and this can be shown using
corporate data, then such biases can be corrected resulting
in better decisions.
This thesis analysed organizational forecasts to to see
if the tasic theory held. Budget forecasts were used as the
focus of the investigation because they are critical to the
success of any organization and therefore should be well
thought out. Both the Navy Stock Fund (an accounting entity
of a large government organization) and an operating divi-
sion of a private sector corporation were analysed sepa-
rately to see what similarities and differences could be
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found. In the stcck fund, the analysis had two major
elements. First, future year budget forecasts and current
year approved budgets were contrasted tc determine if
patterns other than inflation could be identified. If
patterns could be fcund and analyzed then better forecasts
might be achieved. Secondly, the accuracy of individual
forecasts was checked by comparing future forecasts with the
subsequent approved budgets. This would not only point out
possible differences in individual manager's forecasting
technigues and accuracy, but a study of the direction in
which the forecast was off would provide insight intc the
application of heuristic principles in an organizational
structure.
With respect tc the Navy Stock Fund, no decisive
patterns were found to exist across all budget projects.
Examples cf the existence of biases associated with reliance
on heuristic principles in decision making can be shown in
individual tudget projects. It appeared, however, that
accuracy of the forecasts was determined more by the
stability of the budget project by than behavioral biases.
The data show the more stable budget projects (21 and 38)
have mere accurate forecasts than than the less stable ones
(14 and 81) . The most stable project (21) had almost no
evidence cf forecasting bias. There was, however, seme
evidence cf anchcr and adjustment, representativeness, and
aspiration level present in the forecasts of the less stable
projects. Additionally, political pressures have a signifi-
cant effect en forecasts within the Navy Stcck Fund making
it difficult to imprcve on the current method for making
forecasts. Understanding the possible biases associated
with reliance on heuristics in decision making might help
the individual manager make better predictions, but organi-
zational pressures ccupled with the tendency to aggregate
data and therefore otscure possible patterns reduces -"-heir
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usefulness. In other words, the psychological patterns
discussed in the literature may be present at the individual
level but are overcome by the organizational structure of
the Navy Stock Fund.
The data analyzed from Corporation A were different in
form frcm that of the Navy Stock Fund, but performed essen-
tially the same purpose and revealed essentially the same
results. Corporation A prepares an annual Profit Plan in
December for the following year and updates it throughout
the year using a One-Month-Ahead update. These forecasts
were compared to actual totals for a given time pericd to
see if the biases associated with heuristic principles were
apparent. Examples of the effect of anchor and adjustment
can te seen in several instances but \the data did not
support any conclusions that are applicable across the
board. Trends such as conservatism in forecasting resulting
in under correction are apparent under certain circumstances
but not in others. When things were going poorly,
predictions tended to overstate the problem however, when
things were going well, forecasts exceeded actual results.
When aggregated, the monthly inaccuracies tended to cancel
each ether out and averages of the One-Month- Ahead plans
were extremely accurate.
As pointed out in the individual analysis in Chapters
III and IV there are instances where the effects of the
theory can be seen. There are an egual number of situations
however, where no such correlation can be shown. The
tendency for operational managers to be pessimistic when
things are going badly and overly optimistic when things are
going well can be shown but not with enough freguency to
make it a useable predictive tool.
Overall, this research has broken new ground in
combining behavioral decision theory and organizational
forecasting. As a first cut, conclusive results were not
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visible. The data do show however, that reliance or. the
simple minded' technique of anchoring and adjustment is net
justified. Future research should attempt to obtain larger
data sets and begin to look for more context dependent
biases. For example, looking for different effects in
periods of growth than in periods of decline, or differances
effected by the stability of the industry. The area of
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Budget Project 38 ($ x 1000)



























































































































Buaget Project 21 ($ x 1000)
NEW MATERIAL ORDERS OBLIGATIONS
YEAR/
TR BUDGET FORECAST BUDGET FORECAST
981/1 178000. 193000. 170000. 18700C.
/2 170000. 183000. 175000. 182000.
/3 182000. 199000. 183300. 202000.
/4 1S4600. 211300. 195451. 214864.
?
1962/1 195000. 208000. 177000. 190000.
/2 185000. 197000. 198000. 210000.
/3 19500C. 205000. 198000. 228000.
/4 199300. 220900. 198086. 220108.
1983/1 210000. 218000. 195000. 200000.
/2 193000. 210000. 200000. 220000.
/3 197000. 207000. 195000. 205000.
/4 201800. 216500. 209400. 223500.
DISBURSEMENT INVENTORIES
YEAR/
~TB EUDGET FORECAST BUDGET FORECAST
981/1 172000. 187000. 75236. 82036.
/2 172000. 182000. 76236. 83236.
/3 188000. 202000. 78236. 85236.
/4 193451. 214864. 79878. 85778.
1
1982/1 179000. 192000. 86500. 92500.
/2 196000. 210000. 87500. 94000.
/3 197000. 206000. 89000. 96000.
/4 199086. 220108. 91126. 97526.
1963/1 197000. 202000. 92500. 97000.
/2 198000. 218000. 94000. 99000.
/3 195000. 205000. 95000. 99500.
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